Titulo: "Aggregation and Convexity in the Provision of Dynamic Incentives


In this paper, I identify an alternative preference structure that preserves most of the cherished simplicity of the formulation of the Principal-Agent problem pioneered by Holmstrm and Milgrom (1987). The main advantage of my approach is in relation to the structure of the optimal contract: it adds a convex component to their optimal linear contract. This provides new opportunities to revisit empirical predictions and studies based o⁄ of their linear formulation and to demonstrate how the empirical irregularities may be at least partially explained by this one additional component identied here.

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Fecha y hora: 7 de noviembre de 2019 | 13:00 hrs
Lugar: Sala P302 (Diagonal Paraguay # 257, Santiago, Chile)

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