Autores: Reed Smith

J. Reed Smith es Ph.D. in Accounting and Management Information Systems de Ohio State University y Master of Accountancy de la University of Tenesee, Knoxville. Actualmente trabaja como Professor Accounting de la Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Estados Unidos. Sus investigaciones se relacionan con las áreas de accounting information systems, auditing, y game theory; y cuenta con importantes publicaciones en revistas de la disciplina tales como The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research y Review of Accounting Studies.   

Abstract:

We examine the strategic effects of auditor tenure on the auditor’s testing strategy and the manager’s inclination to commit fraud. Most empirical studies conclude that longer tenure improves audit quality. Proponents of restricting tenure argue that longer tenure impairs audito independence and a "fresh look" from a new auditor results in higher audit quality. Validating this argument requires testing whether the observed difference in audit quality between a continuing auditor and a change in auditors is less than the theoretically expected difference in audit quality without impairment. Our findings provide the guidance necessary for developing such tests. Our results show that audit risk (the probability that fraud exists and goes undetected) is lower in both periods for the continuing auditor than with a change in auditors. More importantly, we show that across both periods, expected undetected fraud is lower for the continuing auditor than with a change in auditors.

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Fecha y hora: 5 de julio de 2018 | 13:00 hrs
Lugar: Sala P307 (Diagonal Paraguay # 257, Santiago, Chile)

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